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First Union v. SunTrust Bankv The Fight for Wachovia and Its
linpact on North Carolina Corporate Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Wachovia Corporation (Wachovia) and First Union
Corporation (First Union) merged on September 1, 2001, to form
a new company called Wachovia Corporation (new Wachovia).'
The combination creates the nation's fourth largest commercial
banking organization, with consolidated assets of $328.5 billion.2
However, before the Wachovia/First Union merger could be
consummated, Wachovia had to fend off an unsolicited merger
proposal by Atlanta-based SunTrust Banks, Inc. (SunTrust), the
nation's twelfth largest banking organization Because contested
1. David Boraks, Review 2001: This Summer's Clfjlanger The Battle for
WMachovia, Am. BANKER, Dec. 26, 2001, at 4 [hereinafter Boraks, This Summer's
ClIffhangerj; First Union, First Union Corporate Overicw, at http:-(p.,rsonalfinance.
firstunion.comfpf/corp0,,3,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
2. Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holding Companies, First Union
Corporation, Charlotte, North Carolina and Wachovia Corporation, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 6184 (Aug. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Fed Order
Approving the Merger of First Union and Wachovia]. Prior to the merger, First
Union was the sixth largest commercial banking organization in the United States,
with total consolidated assets worth $252.9 billion, and controlling appromimately 4.1
percent of total banldng assets of insured commercial banks in the United States. Id.
First Union operated subsidiary banks in Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Id. at 1-2. Respectively, Waeho~ia was
the fifteenth largest commercial banking organization in the United States, vAth total
consolidated assets worth $75.6 billion, and controlling appro.imately 1.3 percent of
total U.S. banking assets. Id. at 2. Wachovias subsidiary banks operated in
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia. Id. at 4.
3. Federal Reserve System Order Approving the Acquisition and Establishment
of Branches, SunTrust Banks, Atlanta, Georgia, 88 Fed. Res. Bull. 122 (Dec. 17,
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takeover attempts in banking are rare, the well-publicized
SunTrust campaign attracted widespread attention.4 After a proxy
battle using full-page newspaper advertisements,' Wachovia
shareholders approved the negotiated merger with First Union on
August 3, 2001, ending one of the most expensive and highly
publicized takeover battles in banking history.6
The takeover war was fought on three major fronts,
including a vigorous publicity campaign by all parties to win
shareholder votes,7 a lobbying campaign by First Union and
Wachovia to enlist the North Carolina General Assembly to
amend the North Carolina corporate statutes,' and a lawsuit filed
by SunTrust to revoke the key deal protection clauses in the First
Union/Wachovia merger agreement.9 As a result of the successful
lobbying by First Union and Wachovia, North Carolina lawmakers
and Governor Mike Easley came to the defense of Wachovia in an
effort to fend off SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal by
passing a bill in June 2001, amending Section 55-7-02(a) of the
North Carolina General Statutes." The amended statute limits the
2001) [hereinafter Fed Approval Order of SunTrust Branches]. Asset data are as of
September 30, 2001. Id. at 122 n.2.
4. David Boraks, Few Cards Unplayed as Aug. 3 Vote Nears, AM. BANKER, July
23, 2001, at 1; David Boraks, Hostile Bids, Still Rare for Financials, May Grow More
Common, AM. BANKER, Dec. 31, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Boraks, Hostile Bids]; Tom
Shean, Merger Effort Cost SunTrust $30 Million, Half Went to Ads Aimed at
Investors, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Aug. 11, 2001, at Dl.
5. Boraks, This Summer's Cliffhanger, supra note 1, at 4.
6. Chris Serres, Bank War Costly for All Involved, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), Aug. 11, 2001, at Dl.
7. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 97-121 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
10. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-201, § 15 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-7-02(a)(2)) (enacted on June 14, 2001). The new law amends Section 55-7-02(a)
of the North Carolina General Statutes to read:
(a) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders: (1)
On call by its board of directors or by one or more officers of the
corporation authorized to do so by the articles of incorporation or
bylaws or, in the case of a corporation that is not a public
corporation, by any other person or persons authorized to do so by
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws; or (2) Within 30 days
after the holders of at least ten percent (10%) of all the votes
entitled to be cast on any issue proposed to be considered at the
proposed special meeting sign, date, and deliver to the
corporation's secretary one or more written demands for the
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right of shareholders of public corporations to call a special
meeting and was intended to prevent SunTrust from using the
original provision in a manner First Union believed to be not
intended by the legislature." The new law was criticized by some
scholars because it protected First Union and Wachovia at the
expense of shareholders of public corporations in general.' "
The takeover battle was also played out in the courts as
sixteen lawsuits were filed in federal and state courts in Georgia
and North Carolina.13 In July 2001, the North Carolina Business
Court denied SunTrust's motion for a preliminary injunction by
upholding a key deal protection measure in the First
UnionlWachovia merger agreement. 4 Judge Ben F. Tennille's
meeting describing the purpose or purposes for vhich it is to be,
held- except however that, unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation, the call of a special meeting by shareholders is
not available to the shareholders of a public corporation.
2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-201, § 15 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-
02(a)(2)); see also Chris Serres, Netv Law Hurts SunTrust/But It Limits Options for
Shareholders, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), June 15, 2001, at DI [hereinafter
Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust].
11. Serres, New Law Hurts StuTrust, supra note 10, at Dl (stating that the
amended statute limits shareholders' options); RUSSELL ROBINSON, NORTH
CAROLINA CORPORATION LAw' § 8-3, n.1 (2001 Supp., forthcoming 2052) (manuscript
on file vith N.C. Banking Institute). Mr. Robinson, a founding partner of Robinson
Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., is a well-recognized expert on corporate law in North
Carolina. He represented First Union in First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks. Inc.
See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10j75. 9 1
(Aug. 10, 2001), available at http:llvww,:.ncbusinesscourt.netopinionsi2W)1%
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25.2002).
12. Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust. supra note 10. at D1 (citing Tony Plath, a
professor of finance at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte); see also
Interview with Thomas L. Hazen, CAy C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter Hazen Interview]. See generally Thomas L. Hazen, Silcncing the
Shareholders' Voice, 80 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming Fall 2002) (manuscript at 4-17, on
file vith N.C. Bandng Institute)[hereinafter Hazen, Silencing the Sharchohlers'
Voice].
13. See First Union Proxy Statement/Prospcetus, Notice of Shareholder Meeting
to Consider the Merger of First Union and Wachovia (dated June 27. 2001), at 171-74
(on file vith N.C. Banldng Institute) [hereinafter First Union Proxy Statement]
(listing sixteen lawsuits relating to the WachoviafFirst Union merger filed by June 27,
2001).
14. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct,, 01-CVS-
10075, T 166 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http:f/l wvw.ncbu'sinesscourt.netopinionsI
2001%20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2002). The North Carolina
Business Court established in 1996 is a trial level court intended to create a "court
system as responsive and predictable as the Delaw.are Chancery Court in dealing with
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sixty-three-page opinion in First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc. attracted national attention to the North Carolina Business
Court because it was the first time that the court decided to review
a merger decision by the board of directors of a public corporation
in North Carolina.
1 5
Part II of this Note introduces the contest for control of
Wachovia, including a timeline of major events and significant
litigation related to the merger.1 6 Part III then discusses the
proposals of SunTrust and First Union and the roles played by
others, including the media, investment banks, and state
lawmakers. 7 Part IV discusses the controversial law enacted by
the North Carolina legislature during the heated contest and its
impact. 8 In Part VI, this Note examines the North Carolina
Business Court decision in First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc. and compares the court's decision to Delaware law.'9 Finally,
this Note concludes that the merger review process adopted by the
North Carolina Business Court is pro-management by putting the
burden of proof upon the shareholders when shareholders of a
corporation sue the directors for breach of fiduciary duty in a
merger context.2
complex corporate issues." See History of the North Carolina Business Court
(introducing the history of the court and describing the procedure by which a case
may be designated as complex business litigation and automatically assigned to a
Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases of the Business Court), at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/history.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2002). In January of
1996, Ben F. Tennille was appointed as North Carolina's first Special Superior Court
Judge for Complex Business Cases. Id. Currently, the Business Court is located in
Greensboro with Judge Tennille as its only judge. Id. In 2001, the court issued nine
written opinions in complex business cases. See the North Carolina Business Court's
website, at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.netlopinions/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002). See
generally, Carrie A. O'Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court. North
Carolina's Special Superior Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST.
367 (2002) (discussing the North Carolina Business Court).
15. Chris Serres, A Clear Winner: The Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
July 24, 2001, at D1. (stating that after Judge Tennille posted his opinion more than
28,000 people visited the state Business Court website including lawyers as far away
as San Mateo, California).
16. See infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 97-121 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 122-210 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
338 [Vol. 6
20021 NORTH CAROLINA ISSUES 339
II. TiNIELINE OF EVENTS
Wachovia, First Union, and SunTrust each have a major
presence in banking industry on the East Coast. " As of March
2001, Wachovia ranked fourteenth in the nation in terms of total
consolidated assets.? Wachovia had dual headquarters in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Atlanta, Georgia.r First
Union was headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina and had
branches throughout the East coast.2 Headquartered in Atlanta,
Georgia, SunTrust had total assets of $103 billion and branches
across six states-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
Tennessee and Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia.'
As consolidation continued throughout the banking
industry, merger talks were common among competing banks. In
fact, SunTrust talked with Wachovia about partnering several
times during the past decade. 6 Wachovia attracted SunTrust for
two major reasons. First, a merger with Wachovia would expand
SunTrust's banking network into the demographically desirable
Carolinas market where SunTrust does not operate.2r Second, a
21. See Fed Order Approving the Merger of First Union and Wachoia, supra
note 2. Although the transaction to merge Wachoia and First Union completed on
September 1, 2001 with the merger of the holding companies, the tvo principal
banldng subsidiaries, i.e., First Union National Bank and Wacho%ia Bank, N.A. will
continue to operate separately until the two branch networks are integrated into one.
See Wachovia's website, at http:I/v.wachoia.comfmeerfaqsnext.a;sp (last
visited Feb. 13, 2002). The new company has not announced vwhen it will officially
take the name Wachovia. Id. For information on Wachoia's and First Union's
rankings and assets, see Fed Order Approving the Merger of First Union and
Wachovia, supra note 2, at 6&4 (also listing the states in vhich they each had
subsidiaries). For comparable information on SunTrust, sce Fed Approval Order of
SunTrust Branches, supra note 3, at 122.
22. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 112.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Fed Approval Order of SunTrust Branches, supra note 3, at 12. Asset
data are as of September 30, 2001. For the geographic operation of SunTrust, see
2000 Annual Report of SunTrust Banks, Inc., at 71-72, available at
http:[llvTw.shareholder.comlsuntrustlannua99100ar.pdf (last -isited Feb. 14, 20)2).
26. Armed with Board Support, Baker Courts Shareholders,
A.NiERICANBAN.KER.COM, May 23, 2001 (presenting a letter from Wachoia
CEO Baker to all Wachovia shareholders on May 22, 20011. at
http:/vw.americanbanker.com (on file with N.C. Banking Institute) [hereinafter
Armed with Board Support].
27. David Boraks, SunTrust No Deal 'Anytime Soon,' A%. BxNKER, Aug. 9,
2001, at 1.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
combination with Wachovia would provide SunTrust with
Wachovia's strong regional retail brokerage.28 In December 2000,
a merger agreement between SunTrust and Wachovia was drafted,
providing a number of "deal protection" devices.29 However, the
merger discussion was abruptly terminated by Wachovia on
December 14, 2000, one day before the Wachovia board's
scheduled vote on the merger agreement. °
In fact, L.M. "Bud" Baker, Jr., Wachovia's Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer, had been talking with both
SunTrust and First Union at the same time, although neither
SunTrust nor First Union knew about Mr. Baker's two-track
courtship.3' During late 2000 and early 2001, Baker and First
Union CEO G. Kennedy Thompson had further discussions
regarding a possible merger between First Union and Wachovia.32
On April 9, 2001, First Union and Wachovia signed a reciprocal
confidentiality agreement.33 The companies immediately started
intensive due diligence reviews of each other's operations and
began negotiating on specific terms of the stock-for-stock merger-
of-equals.34 Because of the confidentiality agreement, Baker did
not confirm the rumors about a possible merger between
Wachovia and First Union when his counterpart at SunTrust called
to ask about the rumors.35
After the boards of both banks approved the merger
agreement,36 First Union and Wachovia announced the proposed
$12.7 billion stock-for-stock merger on April 16, 2001. 37 On May
28. Id.
29. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075,
91 99. Particularly, a reciprocal option clause of the merger agreement would allow
SunTrust or Wachovia to purchase 19.9 % of the other's stock in the event of a
merger with a third party. Id. There was no cap on that option and it could be
triggered during the eighteen months after the merger agreement was terminated.
Id.
30. Id. 1 101.
31. Id. 9 94.
32- Id. 104.
33. Id. 91 105.
34. Id.
35. Id. 9 112.
36. For the reasons why the two boards recommended the merger, see infra notes
54-57 and accompanying text.
37. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 91 118. As of March 31,
2001, the total purchase price for Wachovia was $13.4 billion. First Union Proxy
Statement, supra note 13, at 187. Because the proposed merger was a stock-for-stock
[Vol. 6340
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14, 2001, SunTrust publicly announced its unsolicited $14.7 billion
proposal to merge vth Wachovia?5 On May 22, the Wachovia
board voted fourteen to one to affirm the First Union merger and
to reject the SunTrust offer. 9 On the same day, First Union sued
SunTrust in North Carolina Superior Court, alleging that SunTrust
interfered with the merger agreement. Wachovia joined the suit
the next day, accusing SunTrust of violating a confidentiality
agreement signed during their December 2000 merger talks.4' On
May 23, 2001, SunTrust sued Wachovia and First Union in the
Georgia Superior Court, seeking an injunction to halt the merger 2
On June 1, 2001, Wachovia, First Union, and SunTrust agreed that
all litigation brought by them would be moved to the North
Carolina Business Court.43 In the consolidated suit, SunTrust
asked the North Carolina Business Court to revoke a non-
termination provision in the First UnionlWachovia merger
agreement.44  SunTrust also requested the court enjoin
consummation of the merger pending determination of the validity
transaction, the value of the merger agreement constantly changed as the price of
First Union stocks fluctuated. For the dollar amount of the transaction in April 2001,
see John Labate, New Twist in Wachovia Fqht, FIN. TIMES (London), July 21, 2091, at
S. For the value of the merger agreement in August, see First Union Shareholders
Approve Wachovia Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C4. Interestingly, it vas
reported that upon learning of the First UnionWachovia merger plans, the initial
reaction of L. Phillip Humann, chief executive of SunTrust, vas 'disbelief." David
Boraks, Online Exclusive: An Interview with SunTrust's Humann-"We Had Hope
Until the Last Minute," AMERICANBANKER.COM. Aug. 9, 2001, at
http:IlvwT.-.americanbanker.com [hereinafter An Interview with SunTrust's Humann]
(on file with N.C. Banking Institute). After the WachovialFirst Union merger, the
new Wachovia "will be No. 1 in deposit share in key SunTrust states such as Virginia
and Georgia." Boraks, SunTrust: No Deal "Anytime Soon,' supra note 27, at 1.
38. Laura Mandaro & Alissa Leibowitz, Spurned Suitor SunTrust Returns-And
This Time It's Hostile, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2001, at 1; see also David Boraks,
SunTrust CEO: Won't Raise Wachovia Offer, AM. BANKER, May 31,22001, at 1.
39. See Armed with Board Support, supra note 26.
40. See First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 171 (presenting detailed
procedure history of various suits filed in connection with the Wachovia First Union
merger by June 26,2001).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 172.
43. Id at 171.
44. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-1(075,
1 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http:lt v.ncbusinesscourt.netlopinionsi20l%
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,2002).
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of provisions in an option agreement that was part of the merger
agreement.45
On July 20, 2001, the North Carolina Business Court
invalidated the non-termination provision,4' but upheld the
validity of the option agreement which provided a termination fee
up to $780 million to the non-breaching party in case one merger
partner accepted a third party bid. 7 SunTrust's requests for
injunctive relief were denied. 8  Subsequently, First Union,
Wachovia, and SunTrust voluntarily dismissed their claims and
counterclaims.49 Wachovia shareholders approved the merger
with First Union on August 3, 2001.50 On September 1, 2001, the
new Wachovia Corporation was formed.5'
III. CHOICE OF PARTNER: SUNTRUST V. FIRST UNION
As early as the fall of 2000, Wachovia's board adopted a
strategy proposed by a consulting firm identifying both First Union
and SunTrust as potential merger partners. z During the following
months, Wachovia's management had confidential merger
negotiations with both First Union and SunTrust separately. 3 In
April 2001, Wachovia's board adopted and recommended to their
shareholders a merger with First Union instead of SunTrust 4
45. Id.
46. Id. 166.
47. Id. 151; see infra notes 122-210 and accompanying text.
48. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 91166.
49. See Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-
CVS-10075, available at http://cx2000.ncbusinesscourt.net/Caselnformation?Case-
No=01CVS10075 (last visited Feb. 28,2002) (on file with N.C. Banking Institute).
50. Boraks, This Summer's Cliffhanger, supra note 1, at 4.
51. Id.
52. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 1 93-94 (stating that the
strategy was recommended by McKinsey & Co., a consulting firm retained by
Wachovia). It is reported that Wachovia might have intended to sell itself because of
slipping credit quality and loss of earnings. See Liz Moyer, First Union? SunTrust?
What Some Voters Say, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2001, at 1.
53. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 94.
54. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 9-10. First Union's board and
Wachovia's board stated the following reasons for their recommendation of the
merger: (1) a unique opportunity for substantial earnings accretion in the near term
and potential price-earnings multiple expansion in the future; (2) a unique strategic
fit of First Union and Wachovia because of their similar geographic scope and
product mix; (3) significant cost savings resulting from business unit function
reductions, eliminating duplicative staff unit functions, and consolidating facilities;
342 [Vol. 6
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In a letter to Wachovia shareholders, Baker identified the
following reasons for the board's decision to merge with First
Union: (1) shareholders would benefit from "substantial earnings
accretion from the outset and potential price-earnings multiple
expansion in the future;" 55 (2) Wachovia and First Union had "a
genuine sharing of strengths and a cooperative determination of
business strategies and practices;"S'b and (3) First Union had
recently emerged from a difficult period mainly caused by the
integration of two past acquisitions and the result of the
transformation was "the revitalization of the company."' Baker
also presented several reasons why the board had rejected the
SunTrust proposal: (1) a combined SunTrustVachovia "would
grow more slowly and be less profitable than a combined First
Union/Wachovia or . . . Wachovia alone;"5' 3 (2) there were
"insurmountable strategic and operational obstacles to combining
SunTrust and Wachovia;"59 and (3) the potential returns to
Wachovia shareholders from an unsolicited acquisition by
SunTrust were "unattractive." '  Particularly, Baker pointed out
that there was no dividend advantage to SunTrust's unsolicited
proposal.6
and (4) similar management philosophies and complementary strengths possessed by
the respective management teams of First Union and Wachoia. IL
55. Armed with Board Support, supra note 26. The combination of
Wachovia/First Union would be by far larger than that of Wachoia'SunTrust.
Mandaro & Leibowitz, supra note 38, at 1. The combined WachoviaTFirst Union
"would have $330 billion of assets and 19 million customers spread up and down the
East Coast." Id. The combined WachoviatSunTrust "would have $180 billion of
assets, 7.5 million retail customers, and leading deposit market shares in Georgia,
South Carolina, and Virginia." Id.
56. Armed with Board Support, supra note 26.
57. Id. But see Moyer, supra note 52, at 1 (pointing to First Union's recent track
record-a string of expensive deals, botched merger integrations, and asset-quality
problems-as reason enough to steer clear of a combination).
58. Armed with Board Support, supra note 26.
59. Id. (stating that even with Baker 'serving as CEO of a combined
SunTrustWachovia for two years, maintaining the WVachoxia name, and Wachovia
directors filling half the board, the divergent strategies for future grovw th could not e
reconciled").
60. Id. Baker further discussed the board's concern about SunTrust's probable
lackluster earning growth, SunTrust's inability to grow important business lines, the
deterioration in SunTrust's core earnings, and serious implementation risk in the
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SunTrust CEO Humann believed that SunTrust's offer was
a better combination than the First Union offer.62 First, SunTrust
offered a four percent to seventeen percent premium over First
Union's proposal.63 Second, only approximately 4,000 employee
jobs would be lost,' almost none of which would be lost by North
Carolina employees, and no North Carolina branches would be
closed.65 In contrast, First Union had announced its merger would
result in the loss of 7,000 jobs66 and the closing of approximately
300 branches.67 Third, the earnings growth at SunTrust had
outpaced First Union's in each of the past three years.68
Both Wachovia's board and First Union's board believe
that the combined company can achieve cost savings of
approximately $890 million per year or eight percent of combined
non-interest expenses by the end of 2004.69 Since First Union and
Wachovia have subsidiaries operating in many of the same states,
much of their merger is "in-market," which means that there are
likely to be significant cost savings by reducing redundant
personnel, closing duplicate branches, and increasing the
company's purchasing power in given markets.70 There was much
62. David Boraks, SunTrust CEO: Won't Raise Wachovia Offer, AM. BANKER,
May 31, 2001, at 1.
63. Id. Because both SunTrust's and First Union's merger proposals are stock-
for-stock mergers, the value of their bids constantly changed as the companies' stock
prices rose and fell. Accordingly, the difference between SunTrust's proposal and
First Union's offer constantly changed as well.
64. Mandaro & Leibowitz, supra note 38, at 1.
65. Lee E. Knott, Jr.,... Bank's Better Bid, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
June 22, 2001, at A16 (the author claimed to be a longtime Wachovia shareholder)
[hereinafter Knott, Bank's Better Bid].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Chris Serres, SunTrust Holds Firm on Its Offer, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), July 7, 2001, at D1. SunTrust's earnings grew by forty-one percent in 2000,
rising from $3.04 per share to $4.30 per share. Chris Serres, Now They've Gone to
Court/SunTrust Sues Wachovia and First Union, Which Fire Back, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 24, 2001, at D1 [hereinafter Now They've Gone to
Court]. Over the same period, First Union's earnings declined by ninety-eight
percent, falling from $2.95 per share to $.07 per share. Id.
69. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 10.
70. Memorandum from Lisa Broome, Law Professor at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Director of the Center for Banking and Finance at UNC-
CH Law School, to author (December 4, 2001) (on file with N.C. Banking Institute)
[hereinafter Broome]. See generally First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at
9-10 (stating potential cost savings after the proposed merger); Fed Order Approving
344 [Vol. 6
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less geographic overlap between SunTrust's and Wachovia's
operations.7' As a result, a SunTrustlVachovia merger would
involve fewer employee lay-offs and have less cost-saving potential
than a First Union!Wachovia merger. 2
Notably, the negotiated merger agreement with First Union
provided benefits worth $70 million to key Wachovia executives.73
This caused some Wachovia shareholders to doubt whether the
First Union deal was indeed superior as recommended by the
management.74 Nevertheless, Raymond C. Groth, an expert in the
mergers and acquisitions area, regarded the benefits offered to
Wachovia executives as not uncommon compared to those offered
in other similar negotiated mergers7
Following SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal, First
Union, Wachovia, and SunTrust fought an all-out proxy battle.
Many of the Wachovia shareholders were believed to be looking at
the market prices of SunTrust's proposal and First Union's offer
when they voted on the merger with First Union. " As both offers
were stock-for-stock mergers, the constantly changing stock prices
of First Union and SunTrust caused change of the value of their
offers accordingly.' Most institutional investors believed that
SunTrust's proposal should have been at least seven percent larger
than First Union's to convince Wachovia shareholders to take the
the Merger of First Union and Wachovia, supra note 2 (discussing antitrust issues
triggered by the merger of First Union and Wachovia).
71. See supra note 2 for a list of states in which Wachovia had subsidiaries. See
text accompanying supra note 25 for a list of states in %vhich SunTrust had branches.
72. Broome, supra note 70.
73. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 12 (stating that "the value of
the incremental payments and benefits the executive officers and directors of
Wachovia could receive is $70 million"). Particularly, Mr. Baker would receive
$2 million per year for life upon his retirement. Moyer, supra note 52, at 1. Later
Mr. Baker relinquished $500,000 of that annual retirement benefit. Id.
74. Moyer, supra note 52, at 1.
75. Telephone interview vith Raymond C. Groth, former Senior Vice President
and Managing Director of First Union Securities, Inc. (Jan. 9, 2012) (on file vith N.C.
Banlng Institute) [hereinafter Groth Interview]. Since the 1970's, Mr. Groth has
worked in a broad range of investment banking activities and is recognized as an
expert specialized in the mergers and acquisitions field. L
76. Boraks, An Interview with SwuTnst's Humnann, supra note 37: see also E-mail
from Russell M. Robinson II, Founding Partner, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson,
P.A., to author (Oct. 30, 2001, 14:17:35 EST) (on file with N.C. Banking Institute)
[hereinafter Robinson, Oct. Email].
77. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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unusual step of rejecting a negotiated merger agreement at their
August 3rd meeting." Although SunTrust's proposal would have
provided a seventeen percent premium over the First Union
merger when SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal was
announced, by the end of the same day the gap shrank to five
percent because of the fall of SunTrust's stock price. 79
Between the time SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal
was announced and the Wachovia shareholders were asked to vote
on the First Union/Wachovia merger agreement, First Union's
stock rose about thirteen percent.8 0 Thus, the difference between
SunTrust's offer and First Union's was narrowed to about five
percent, which made it difficult for SunTrust to tout a significantly
superior proposal in terms of stock price.8" Considering the
uncertainty of an unsolicited merger proposal, one New York-
based merger and acquisition expert believed the difference
between the two proposals was not significant enough to compel
shareholders to accept an unsolicited offer.82
Overall, the SunTrust/First Union/Wachovia takeover
battle is characterized as unusually hostile in the banking industry
because both First Union and SunTrust fought the battle with
aggressive attacks in the national media. 3 In order to win
78. Boraks, SunTrust CEO: Won't Raise Wachovia Offer, supra note 62, at Dl.
79. Id.
80. Wachovia Bought 550 Million USD of First Union Shares to Fend Off
Sun Trust, AFX EUR. Focus, Aug. 15, 2001, at Company News [hereinafter Wachovia
Bought Shares]. Notably, AFX EUROPEAN Focus mistakenly reported that
Wachovia purchased $550 million of First Union shares. Id. According to SEC
filings, during the second quarter of 2001, Wachovia repurchased approximate eight
million shares of its common stock to offset the approximately seven million shares
issued to acquire Republic Security Financial Corporation and Hamilton Dorsey
Alston Company. Form 10-Q filed by Wachovia Corp. with SEC, Aug. 13, 2001, at
31, at http://vww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/774203/000095010901502821/dl0q.txt
(last visited Feb. 25, 2002). Those purchases were made under a January 28, 2000
authorization effective through January 25, 2002. Id.
81. Wachovia Bought Shares, supra note 80.
82. Chris Serres, Sun Trust Could Up the Ante / Bank Still Has Time to Raise Its
Bid, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), June 28, 2001, at D1 (quoting Tom Burnett,
president of Merger Insight, a New York-based firm that provides research on
mergers and acquisitions); Boraks, Hostile Bids, supra note 4.
83. See generally Kenneth H. Thomas, Intimations of a World Where Investment
Banks Speak Out, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 2001, at 7 [hereinafter Thomas, Where
Investment Banks Speak Out]. For example, a First Union advertisement titled "Six
Things SunTrust Won't Be Talking About Today" appeared in several major
newspapers on July 6, 2001, alleging that SunTrust's potential earning growth had
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Wachovia shareholder support, First Union and SunTrust ran
advertising spots on radio and television stations throughout the
Southeast and bought full-page advertisements in major national
newspapers, including The New York Times and The Wall Street
Journal.' The costs were enormous. It was reported that
SunTrust spent $30 million in investment banking, advertising, and
legal fees in its hostile bid, and First Union and Wachovia spent an
estimated three times that to defend their merger. 5
The costly media war was an unusually prominent feature
of the transaction." According to Russell M. Robinson II, a
nationally-recognized corporate/banking attorney retained by First
Union, the financial analysis published by both sides "served the
useful purpose of raising the level of awareness and information
for the individual shareholders but probably did not affect the
ultimate outcome. ' ,S7  The information provided in the
advertisements was rudimentary." As always, financial
professionals conducted their own analysis of merger proposals,
which would filter into the market with or without newspaper
advertisements. 9 Thus, the press campaign probably influenced
only an insignificant percentage of individual shareholders. '3
When it came to shareholder votes, institutional investors
were the real decision-makers because they owned more than half
of the Wachovia stock.9' Besides the multi-million dollar media
campaign, executives at SunTrust made personal appeals to
institutional shareholders. 2 Although SunTrust's executives were
"hit the wall." Chris Serres, SunTrust Holds Firm on Its Offer NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 7,2001, at Dl.
84. Serres, Bank War Costly for All Izvo'lved, supra note 6, at DI.
85. Id, see also Thomas, Where Investment Banks Speak Out (stating a significant
portion of the fees went to investment banks hired by the companies and they
provided high-quality financial information and analysis to shareholders). Ironically.
the author comments, investment banks should regularly make such information
available to shareholders. Id.
86. E-mail from Russell M. Robinson II, Founding Partner, Robinson Bradshaw
& Hinson, P.A., to author (Jan. 22, 2002, 12:28:57 EST) (on file with N.C. Banking




90. Robinson, Oct. Email, supra note 76.
91. Serres, Now They've Gone to Court, supra note 68, at DI.
92. Id.
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more aggressive in reaching out to the institutional investors than
their counterparts at First Union and Wachovia,93 SunTrust's
merger proposal did not have the approval of Wachovia's board.94
It was uncertain whether a merger with SunTrust would ever be
approved by the Wachovia shareholders against the objection of
the management. Even if SunTrust successfully merged with
Wachovia, a takeover battle of this scale would be extremely costly
to the combined new company. Thus, a group of Wachovia
shareholders believed that a negotiated merger with First Union
was "a bird in the hand," which was better than the unsolicited
SunTrust proposal the fate of which was too uncertain.95 This so-
called "bird-in-the-hand" group of shareholders were believed to
have cast the decisive votes for First Union. 9 6
IV. AMENDMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATE LAW
After Wachovia's board rejected SunTrust's bid, SunTrust
sought to gain control of Wachovia's board by electing more
directors to Wachovia's board who would support SunTrust's
proposal.97 In order to elect additional directors, Wachovia's by-
laws would need to be amended to allow shareholders holding ten
percent or more of the voting shares to call a special shareholder
meeting.9' On June 4, 2001, SunTrust proposed such an
amendment.' If Wachovia shareholders approved the by-law
amendment, SunTrust intended to call a special shareholder
meeting to elect more directors to Wachovia's board who would
favor a SunTrust/Wachovia merger. l00 At this point, the North
Carolina General Assembly came to the aid of Wachovia and First
Union by passing a new law, signed by Governor Mike Easley on
93. Id.
94. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 9-10 (Wachovia's board
proposing the merger with First Union and rejecting SunTrust's proposal to acquire
Wachovia).
95. Robinson, Oct. Email, supra note 76.
96. Boraks, An Interview with Sun Trust's Humann, supra note 37.
97. Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust, supra note 10, at D1.
98. Id.
99. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075,
127 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001 %
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,2002).
100. Id.
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June 15, 2001, that amended the state's corporate law to limit
shareholders' rights in public corporations.01
Under the amended law, special meetings called by
shareholders cannot occur unless the procedure is sanctioned by
the company's articles of incorporation.' " The articles of
incorporation, however, cannot be amended to include such a
procedure without approval from the board of directors."0 3 The
new law made SunTrust's proposed by-law amendment invalid.""
The new law was viewed by First Union as necessary to
allow North Carolina companies "'to protect themselves against
abusive tactics in unsolicited takeover attempts." ' 5  Wachovia
spokesman Jay Reed said that Wachovia was very pleased that
"the state legislature has leveled the playing ground""" by closing
a loophole in state law that would have given SunTrust an unfair
advantage in the takeover battle with First Union. 7  Mr.
Robinson, First Union's attorney, believes that the legislative
amendment was essential to protecting the Wachovia/First Union
merger transaction and to avoid losing Wachovia's headquarters to
another state.103 Nevertheless, he suggested that, due to the
101. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-201, § 15 (codified as amended at N.C. GENN. STAT
§ 55-7-02(a)). See generally Serres, New Law Hurts SumTntst. supra note 10, at D1.
102. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-201, § 15 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. StAT.
§ 55-7-02(a)).
103. Id.; see also First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, q 12.3
(interpreting the amended statute).
104. First Union Corp., 2001 NC Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 12g.
105. Christine Van Dusen, SunTrust Wins One, Loses One in M.C.; Judge Grants
Access to Shareholder List, But State Enacts a Barrier, ATLNTA J. & CONST., June
15,2001, at 1G (quoting First Union CEO Thompson). But see Hazen, Silencing the
Shareholders' Voice, supra note 12, at 4-6, on file vith N.C. Banking Institute)
(criticizing the legislature for favoring First Union by sacrificing the right of
shareholders of all public corporations in North Carolina). See infra notes 119-121
and accompanying text.
106. Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust. supra note 10, at D1.
107. Robinson, Oct. Email, supra note 76.
10S. Id. Mr. Robinson states,
The amendment of G[eneral] S[tatutes] 55-7-02(a) was needed to
defend the First UnioniWachovia deal because of the special
circumstances of this case .... Because of the timing of the
transaction, the merger was put on the agenda for approval at
Wachovia's postponed annual meeting, instead of at a special
meeting of shareholders called just for the purpose of voting on
that matter alone. This was unfortunate because it gave SunTrust
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
disenfranchising effect of the new law, further amendment of the
North Carolina General Statutes is needed to allow shareholders
of public corporations to have "a reasonable right to call a special
meeting.""1°
The North Carolina General Assembly arguably had a
legitimate motive to join the fight against Atlanta-based SunTrust
because the new SunTrust/Wachovia (if SunTrust had won the
takeover battle) would have been headquartered in Atlanta,
Georgia, which would have been associated with job losses and
other adverse economic consequences to North Carolina."'
However, this argument is problematic. As discussed above,
SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal suggested thousands fewer
the chance to also put on the agenda its proposal to amend the
bylaws to give them (10% shareholders) the right to call a special
meeting to elect other directors. Virtually all mergers that may be
contested are submitted to a special meeting. This is done for the
very purpose of restricting consideration to that deal alone-vote
it up or down. Allowing SunTrust to create the appearance (but
certainly not the reality) of giving the shareholders a choice
between two deals was very confusing and prejudicial to the First
Union deal, which needed approval by more than a simple
majority of votes cast-it needed approval by a majority of all
outstanding shares, which would have been inherently difficult, if
[not] impossible, to attain at a meeting with such a confused
agenda. We thought this move by [SunTrust] was just a board-
packing plan that deprived the shareholders of a fair vote on the
firm merger proposal by [First Union]. Moreover, the [SunTrust]
proposal was to adopt a bylaw that would have required a special
meeting to be called within thirty days-not enough time for
Wachovia to defend itself. The only practical way to stop that very
unusual, and we thought very unfair, strategy, was to get the
legislature to adopt the simple amendment that was adopted.
Before asking for this, we determined that it did not prejudice any
of the approximately forty public North Carolina corporations now
in existence. We recognized, however, that it did probably take
away too much from the shareholders as a matter of general long-
term policy, and I expect that to be corrected by a provision that
allows a corporation to have reasonable shareholder right to call a
special meeting, without the defects of the statute that was
amended.
Id.
109. RoBINSON, supra note 11, § 8-3, n.1. Mr. Robinson states that amendment is
needed to "allow public corporations to have a bylaw giving shareholders a
reasonable right to call a special meeting in a manner not subject to unfairness and
abuse" intended by SunTrust. Id.
110. See Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust, supra note 10, at Dl.
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job cuts than First Union's, and almost none of the combined
SunTrust/Wachovia's North Carolina employees would lose their
jobs because of the lack of geographical overlap between the two
companies."' Regardless, many North Carolina attorneys and
corporate managers believe that losing Wachovia to an out-of-
state company would have been a much greater loss to the State of
North Carolina than the closing of some branches as a result of a
merger with First Union."
Thomas L. Hazen, a law professor at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, regards it as unfair that North
Carolina lawmakers came to the defense of Wachovia and First
Union in the middle of a takeover battle."3 In his opinion, "even
if the decision to favor First Union was a good and fair one, it is
questionable whether it is proper for the state legislature to do it at
all."' 4 Professor Hazen further argues, "even assuming that it is
proper for the legislature to intervene, then it should do it for this
instance only rather than change the entire corporate law."" '
Because the new law deprives the right of shareholders in North
Carolina public corporations to call a special meeting without such
stipulation in the company's articles of incorporation or the
board's consent,"6 the impact of this legislation extends well
111. Knott, Bank's Better Bid., supra note 05, at A16; see also Mandaro &
Liebovitz, supra note 38, at 1 (stating that SunTrust exTected to eliminate fev, er jobs
because there would be little geographical overlap between SunTrust's and
Wachovia's operations).
112. Robinson, Oct. Email, supra note 76.
113. Hazen Interview, supra note 12.
114. E-mail from Thomas L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, to author (Jan. 22, 2002, 14:07:29
EST) (on file vith N.C. Banldng Institute) [hereinafter Hazen, Jan. Email].
115. I Professor Hazen also states:
... [11f there was a good reason to favor First Union, then it should
have been attempted directly rather than making a statutory
amendment that applies to all future situations. The problem the
legislature had was not with the statute as it eisted but rather vith
the fact that someone they did not w~ant could use it to their
advantage.
Id. However, as Professor Hazen noted, "IT]here could be constitutional problems
with a legislature ex-plicitly limiting such a proision to one specific transaction.- E-
mail from Thomas L. Hazen to author (Feb. 6. 20102, 22:18:01) EST) (on file with N.C.
Bankdng Institute) [hereinafter Hazen. Feb. Email].
116. Compare 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 201, § 15 (the amended law). n-ith N.C. GEN.
STAT. 55-7-02(a) (1999) (prior to amendment).
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beyond the fight for Wachovia." 7  In a June 2001 newspaper
article, Professor Tony Plath said, "I can understand why our
legislators want to protect First Union, but I'm surprised they
would do this at the expense of shareholders." 18
In his forthcoming article titled Silencing the Shareholders'
Voice, Professor Hazen criticizes that the state legislature "blindly
acquiesced in the desires of corporate management."" 9 He also
suggests that the legislature's unilateral rewriting of the
governance rights embodied in the corporate charter not only
violates the principle of freedom of contract, "it may also be
invalid under the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution."'20 According to Professor Hazen, this was not the
first time that the North Carolina legislature "has embarked on
this unfortunate journey." 121
117. Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust, supra note 10, at D1 (referring to the
opinion of Tony Plath, a professor of finance at the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte).
118. Id. (quoting Tony Plath, a professor of Finance at the University of North
Carolina at Charlotte). Lee E. Knott, Jr., a long-time Wachovia shareholder who was
against the First Union deal, criticized the new law because the North Carolina
General Assembly "has permitted itself to be duped into passing a law hostile to
shareholders of North Carolina [public] corporations in order to preserve [Bud]
Baker's gains." Knott, Bank's Better Bid, supra note 65, at A16.
119. Hazen, Silencing the Shareholder's Voice, supra note 12, at 9-10.
120. Id. at 5, 10 & n.30 (explaining that statutory amendments which have the
effect of rearranging rights within existing corporations is problematic at best and
likely to be unconstitutional). For a general analysis of the constitutional issue
involved in corporate mergers, see Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate
Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REV. 687
(1998).
121. Hazen, Silencing the Shareholder's Voice, supra note 12, at 12 (referring to
another example where the North Carolina legislature amended the state's corporate
law "without any disengaged consideration of the wisdom of reversing a long-held
public policy in order to favor one company" during a takeover bid for Burlington
Industries). In 1980s, a Canadian national made a hostile bid for Burlington
Industries, a company with substantial presence in North Carolina. See Thomas L.
Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 77, 86-87 n. 53 (1988). To help Burlington fend off the takeover bid,
a bill was proposed to the North Carolina General Assembly creating takeover
barriers for corporations which had more than fifty percent of their assets and
employees within the state. Id. When the bill was passed, the percentage of the in-
state assets required was reduced from fifty percent to forty percent as Burlington
was found not to meet the fifty percent threshold. Id.
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V. THE NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT DECISION
Despite losing the battle to amend Wachovia's by-laws due
to the new law passed by the North Carolina General Assembly,
SunTrust did not give up its proposal to merge with Wachovia.
SunTrust vigorously pursued its lawsuit in the North Carolina
Business Court to enjoin the Wachovia shareholders from voting
on the First Union merger agreement.'-" SunTrust claimed the
deal protection measures of the WachovialFirst Union merger
agreement were coercive and, therefore, invalid. 23
The Wachovia/First Union merger agreement included two
key deal protection measures. The first was a non-termination
clause providing that the merger agreement could not be
terminated until January 16, 2002, whether or not the Wachovia
shareholders approved of the merger. This provision had the
effect of preventing Wachovia from entering into any other merger
prior to that date. The second was a stock option agreement under
which the option holder (First Union) could profit by up to $780
million if the option issuer (Wachovia) accepted a merger offer
from a third party before the First Union/Wachovia merger
agreement terminated." The option would continue for eighteen
months upon termination of the First UnionlWachovia merger
agreement if Wachovia abandoned the First Union transaction.'
SunTrust claimed that the option agreement provided an excessive
breakup fee'27 that would effectively block other banks from
making bids for Wachovia.' 2"
On July 20, 2001, the North Carolina Business Court
rejected SunTrust's motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin
consummation of the First UnionlWachovia merger, finding: (1)
the non-termination clause in the merger agreement between First
122. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10f575,
I 1 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http:If% v.nebuinessourt.netopinioni201l%
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
123. Id. T 142.
124. Id. T 118.
125. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 15-16.
126. Id. at 16.
127. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CXS-10075, T 123.
128. Id 141 (stating that SunTrust characterized the breakup fee as
"preclusive").
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Union and Wachovia was invalid and therefore, unenforceable; 129
and (2) the option agreement was non-coercive and hence valid. 30
Since this was the first time a North Carolina court reviewed a
contested merger case,' the court adopted a new approach 3 2 to
determine the validity of deal protection measures in stock-for-
stock mergers.'33 This new approach is in contrast to the
approaches adopted in recent Delaware cases. 3 4
A. North Carolina Approach
Usually, state corporate law provides the most important
standards for review of a target corporation's tender offer
defenses.'35 Some states, including North Carolina, review tender
offer defenses by applying the same business judgment rule that
would be applicable to an ordinary day-to-day decision made by
the board in the absence of self-dealing by any director or
manager.'36
The most influential state law on corporate boards'
fiduciary duties in a takeover context is the Delaware law which
applies a tripartite standard. 37 In the 1964 Delaware case Cheffv.
Mathes, the court established that the board of directors has the
burden of proving that it has reasonable grounds to believe that a
tender offer presents a danger to corporate policy or
effectiveness. 138 In essence, this burden is a modified business





133. Id. T 3 (stating that one issue presented in this case was "what review process
will be used by North Carolina courts to determine the validity of deal protection
measures in stock-for-stock mergers").
134. See infra notes 135-69 and accompanying text. In this case, North Carolina
law controlled.
135. JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS, 1180 (1995).
136. Id.; See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a), (d) (1999).
137. SELIGMAN, supra note 135, at 1180.
138. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964); see also Smith v. Van




directors in the change of control context."' Under Cheff,
directors may "satisfy their burden by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an
honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment appeared reasonable
at the time the decision was made."'14
The second part of the Delaware standard was established
by the Delaware Supreme Court case Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.' In Unocal, the court added the balance element to the
board's duty when adopting measures to forestall a takeover bid. 4 2
The court held, "[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the
ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."'43 Under this approach, if a the court
finds that the board was reasonable in its perception of a threat
and that the defensive measure taken was proportionate to the
threat, the court will then judge the board actions by the
traditional business judgment rule."4
The third part of the Delaware test evolved from the 1985
Delaware case Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes."4 ' Revlon
requires directors to obtain the highest value reasonably available
for shareholders in change of control situations." Revlon has
been criticized for taking away directors' power to consider the
interests of corporate constituents other than shareholders when
responding to a hostile takeover attempt. 4 Subsequently, the
139. SELIGMAN, supra note 135, at 1180: see alsi Van G #r/:omn, 4!1 A.2d at l70-93
(judging a good-faith directors' merger decision under ordinar negligence standard).
140. C'heff, 199 A.2d at 555.
141. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 49 3 A.2d 946 (Del, lIM5).
142. Id. at 955-96.
143. Id. at 955: see also SELIGMAN, supra note 135, at 1 WO. The Unocal tv .-
pronged process was subsequently expanded by Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 3:-3-41 (Del, !N95) (establishing that
a defensive measure that is outside the normal range of defenive measures or that is
"draconian" vAil not be considered proportionate to the perceived threat, and
therefore, fails the Unocal test). The court determined that a draconian measure v,as
one that was preclusive or coercive. Id. at 1387.
144. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 958.
145. Revlon v. MacAndrev.s & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del, I1 5).
146. Id. at 182.
147. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Netv.orh, Inc., ('37 A.2d 34,44
(Del. 1993).
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Delaware Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
applicability of Revlon. 141
Recent evaluation of the Delaware approach recognizes
that the multiple-standards set forth above are somewhat
confusing.19 In his opinion in First Union, Judge Tennille noted,
"the straight application of either the business judgment rule or
the entire fairness test does not work to resolve the tensions
between the conflicting requirements of shareholders and directors
in transactions or board actions affecting the shareholders' right to
sell or vote.""15  He rejected the Revlon standard finding it
inconsistent with North Carolina statutes. 15' Section 55-8-30(d) of
the North Carolina General Statutes provides, "[t]he duties of a
director weighing a change of control situation shall not be any
different, nor the standard of care any higher, than otherwise
provided in this section.' ' 52
The North Carolina Business Court adopted the
"circumstance-specific review procedures"' 53  developed by
Delaware cases, "while avoiding the categorical and linguistic
quagmire of the tripartite standard."'54  The court stated that
judicial review should promote a structural corporate governance
regime with a proper balance between directors' independent
14& See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.
1987) (asserting that the board's Revlon auctioneer duty applies only if the sale of a
target company is "inevitable"); see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-50 (Del. 1989) (rejecting the argument that Time was for
sale when Warner shareholders were to receive sixty-two percent of the combined
company after a merger).
149. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075,
62 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001%
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id. 69.
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(d) (1999). Section 55-8-30 of the North Carolina
General Statute provides:
A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any
failure to take any action, if he performed the duties .... [i]n good
faith; (2) [w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) [i]n a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a), (d).




power to manage and shareholders' right to freely vote on any
fundamental changes to the corporation.'55
The review process adopted by the North Carolina
Business Court in a stock-for-stock merger subject to shareholder
approval is as follows:
[T]he court will first review the transaction,
including the adoption of deal protection measures,
to determine if the directors have complied with
their statutory duty of care under N.C.G.S. § 55-8-
30. The burden is upon the shareholder challenging
their actions to prove that a breach of duty has
occurred. If no breach of duty is proven, the action
of the directors is entitled to a strong presumption
of reasonableness and validity, including
noncoercion, and the court should not intervene
unless the shareholder can rebut that presumption
by clear and convincing evidence that the deal
protection provisions were actionably coercive, or
that the deal protection provisions prevented the
directors from performing their statutory duties. If
a breach of duty is established, the burden shifts to
the directors to prove that their actions were
reasonable and that it is in the best interests of the
shareholders that they be permitted to vote on the
transaction, and, if at issue, that the deal protection
measures were not actionably coercive and did not
prevent the directors from performing their
statutory duties. Where the court finds that the deal
protection measures are coercive or require
directors to breach their statutory duties, the court
must then weigh the harm to the shareholders in
enjoining either the deal protection measures, the
vote on the transaction or the merger, if the
transaction is approved, against the harm resulting
from not entering injunctive relief. That is a very
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The key step of this judicial review process is to determine
whether the directors have complied with their statutory duty of
care under Section 55-8-30(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes which requires a director to act: "(1) [i]n good faith; (2)
[w]ith the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation."'57 If the challenging shareholders cannot prove the
breach of such care by the directors, the court will respect the
judgment of the directors.1 58 However, if the shareholders can
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the deal protection
measures are actionably coercive or require the directors to breach
their statutory duties, the burden shifts to the directors to prove
otherwise.'59
The North Carolina review process differs from the
modified business judgment rule established by Delaware law by
imposing the burden of proof on challenging shareholders instead
of on the directors. 60 Because shareholders usually do not have
access to information necessary to prove a breach of duty on the
part of directors, it would be rather difficult for shareholders to
prove how the directors breached their duty of care.' 6' Thus, by
shifting the burden of proof from the board to shareholders, the
North Carolina review process appeared to be more pro-
management than the Delaware approach. In Professor Hazen's
opinion, "even Delaware which is generally viewed as pro
management does not seem to go as far as North Carolina."' 62
Arguably, the second step of the North Carolina approach
provides one more chance for shareholders to challenge the
judgment of directors even though the directors have passed the
ordinary care test in the first step. 63 If the shareholders prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the deal protection provisions
are coercive or would prevent the management from performing
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a).
158. First Union Corp.. 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 70.
159. Id.
160. Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d. 548, 555 (Del. 1964).
161. Hazen, Jan. Email, supra note 114.
162. Id.
163. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 70.
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their statutory duty of care, the court will intervene and invalidate
such coercive or preclusive provisions.Y
In effect, the new North Carolina approach is likely to
further enhance directors' power to manage and undermine
shareholders' rudimentary right to approve merger transactions by
imposing the burden of proof upon shareholders who usually lack
access to corporate information to upset approval by the directors.
This significant set-back to shareholders' rights is unlikely to be
offset by the supplementary substantive review of the directors'
decisions laid out in the second step when "clear and convincing"
evidence calls for court intervention to protect shareholders'
voting rights on fundamental corporate changes. If the court
consistently applies the ordinary care standard as required by
Section 55-7-02(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes, it is
hard to see how a board's merger decision could possibly pass the
test provided in the first step but fail the test provided in the
second step because the standard of the duty of care should remain
the same in the second step as in the first step.
Vlr. Groth comments that the court's application of the
review process in the First Union case does not provide a clear
guidance as to what standard of care the court would adopt in any
future cases of contested takeover.' First, the opinion rejected
the Delaware approach of an enhanced standard of care in a
contested takeover context because the North Carolina statute
requires no heightened duty of care from directors in a change of
control situation.'66 Nevertheless, Mr. Groth states that the court
referred to rules created by Delaware cases when it reviewed the
decision-making process of Wachovia's board.' 7  It is not clear
how the court would reconcile the potential conflicts between the
North Carolina statutory standard of ordinary care vdth the
enhanced standard of care which is an inherent part of Delaware
case law in the corporate merger area.'" In Mr. Groth's opinion,
this uncertainty inherent in the opinion substantially limits its
precedential value. 69
164. I.
165. Groth Interview, supra note 75.
166. See First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-107t?5, S 69.
167. Groth Interview, supra note 75; see also First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus.
Ct., 01-CVS-10075, JS 87-92.
16S. Groth Interview, supra note 75.
169. Id.
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B. Outcome of the First Union Case
Applying the review process discussed above, the North
Carolina Business Court found that the Wachovia board had met
its statutory duty of care in approving the merger agreement with
First Union, including the deal protection measures. 7° In the first
step of its judicial review process, "the court is only seeing that the
directors did their job, not questioning their decision."'1' The
court concluded that the Wachovia board complied with its
statutory duty of care by making informed, "good faith"
decisions.172
The key issue in this case was whether the deal protection
measures adopted by the Wachovia board were valid. First, the
court recognized the necessity for directors to include reasonable
deal protection measures in order to protect the merger partners'
contractual rights from interference by other parties.'7 Judge
Tennille stated that some deal protection measures, especially
short-term ones, may well be adopted by directors within their
statutory duty of care that "have some preclusive effect, without
necessarily being coercive of the shareholder vote." 174 Applying
the North Carolina review process, the court heavily relied on the
process by which the Wachovia board negotiated, deliberated, and
approved the terms of the merger agreement. 7 5 Recognizing that
the board followed the proper process, the court concluded that
the board complied with its statutory duty of care and therefore,
the deal protection measures adopted by the board were
presumably non-coercive and valid.'76
The termination fee that could have been realized by an
exercise of the stock option agreements had a floor of $375 million
170. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 151.
171. Id. 1 74.
172. Id. [1 131,141.
173. Id. 1 76.
174. Id. 62. Many Delaware decisions have validated various deal protection
measures, including termination fees, strong no-shops, stock option grants, and
matching rights. See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (2000);
Crawford v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. (In re IXC Communications Shareholders Litig.),
Cons. C.A. No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999); Goodwin v.
Live Entertainment, Inc., 741 A.2d 16, 1999 Del. LEXIS 238 (Del. 1999); Matador
Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280 (Del. Ch. 1998).
175. See generally First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, I1 130-44.
176. See generally id.
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and a ceiling of $780 million." The option right could be
triggered by either of the following two events: (1) "a third party
acquire[ing] 25% or more of the common stock of the option
issuer;"' 7  or (2) "the option issuer agree[ing] to, or
recommend[ing] to its shareholders, a business combination or
acquisition transaction (other than the proposed merger) with
another party that would result in the acquisition of more than
25% of the stock or business of the option issuer or a significant
subsidiary."'79 Under this provision, the option right would not be
triggered if the Wachovia shareholders simply disapproved the
merger with First Union without accepting the merger offer of a
third party.' In other words, the Wachovia shareholders could
not have been coerced to approve the merger with First Union.
However, Wachovia would be required to pay a penalty ranging
between $375 million to $780 million if it merged or agreed to
merge with a third party..!" As Wachovia and First Union agreed,
the cap of $780 million had been reached based on SunTrust's
proposal.' Seven hundred and eighty million dollars was
approximately six percent of the total value of the deal, which was
"on the high side" of comparable transactions in the banking
industry.S' Such a high termination fee would preclude other
potential merger opportunities.
In this case, the stock options granted to the merger
partners function as termination fees to protect the transaction.
This type of a deal protection measure is recognized as valid by
Delaware courts.' Under Delaware law, termination fee
provisions are not per se invalid because they could encourage
competing bidders and, therefore, further shareholder interests.'
177. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 15-1.
178. Id. at 15.
179. 1&
ISO. See First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10575, q 147 (stating that
Wachovia could avoid the termination fee by remaining independent until the option
agreement expired).
181. First Union Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 15-1.
182. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct.. 0-CVS-10075, I 140.
183. Id. T 143.
184. See Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for
Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAw. 1609, 1l12-16 (200 -0).
185. Id. at 1612; see, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,
782 (Del. Ch. 1988) (involving a case where the target company had two offers from
two bidders). The board of the target company induced a higher cash offer from one
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Generally, termination fees that have been upheld by Delaware
courts are no more than two to three and a half percent of the
value of the transaction.186 However, a termination fee is more
likely to be deemed invalid if it is seen as a device primarily
motivated by the desire to deter future bidders.18 7 In First Union,
following SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal, First Union and
Wachovia amended the option agreement to the effect that the
profit of the option exercise would reach the $780 million cap.'
At that point, the original merger agreement was already
approved by both Wachovia's board and First Union's board. 89
Thus, neither First Union nor Wachovia would have a reason to
offer more incentive to the other party in order to induce a
merger deal. Among the three amendments made to the option
agreement, the modification of the formula for calculating the
exercise price of a substitute option was challenged by SunTrust
because it allegedly caused the termination fee to be preclusive,
and therefore, coercive. °90 Under the old formula, SunTrust would
bidder by providing a termination fee, since such fee would reimburse the bidder for
at least part of its transaction costs and opportunity cost. See id. at 782-83. The court
decided that shareholders could benefit from the termination fee provision because it
helped to bring the two bids to the same level. Id. By keeping the bidding process
going, the board was likely to obtain an offer that would be even higher. Id.
186. See Varallo & Raju, supra note 184, at 1613 n.9 and accompanying text. For
example, the Court of Chancery refused to enjoin a three and a half percent
termination fee in McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., C.A. No. 16963 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20,
2000). In another case, a three percent break up fee in a $7 billion transaction was
upheld by the Court of Chancery. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp.,
C.A. No. 15650 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997).
187. Varallo & Raju, supra note 184, at 1612 n.8 and accompanying text.
188. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075,
140 (Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001%
20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); see infra note 189 (giving a timeline
of the adoption of the First Union/Wachovia merger proposal, announcement of
SunTrust's unsolicited proposal, and amendment of the option agreement by First
Union and Wachovia).
189. Id. 118. First Union and Wachovia management approved the merger
agreement and the original stock option agreements on April 15, 2001. Id. On May
14, 2001, SunTrust publicly announced its unsolicited proposal to acquire Wachovia.
Id. 119. On May 29, 2001, First Union and Wachovia modified the option
agreement which was later approved by First Union's board and the executive
committee of Wachovia's board. Id. 124.
190. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 141. The controversy
arises out of the word "twice" which was inserted to the calculation formula. Id. T




have had to pay a $440 million termination fee.' However, under
the amended formula, the total amount of the termination fee
would be doubled.9 2 Since this total amount exceeded the $780
million cap, the termination fee was capped at S780 million."' In
other words, the amendment of the option agreement raised the
total amount of termination fee from $440 million to $780 million
for SunTrust.1 4 Given the suspicious timing of this amendment, it
is not unreasonable to inquire whether the option agreement was
amended mainly to deter any third-party bid rather than to protect
the contracting parties' legitimate interests (e.g., to cover
negotiation costs and opportunity cost). However, the court did
not look into this question while determining the validity of the
stock option clause.195
In First Union, the court referred to Delaware cases when it
reviewed the validity of deal protection measures.'" Delaware
courts review the validity of termination fee clauses under one of
two tests: the business judgment rule or the reasonableness of the
liquidated damages. 7  When a termination fee exceeds three
percent of the value of the transaction, it will likely receive very
close judicial scrutiny from a Delaware court because of its
potential preclusive effect on shareholder voting or a third party
bid.19s
In First Union, the termination fee, as a result of the
exercise of the option agreement, would certainly reach the $780
million cap, which is approximately six percent of the value of the
The Substitute Option shall be exercisable for such number of
shares of Substitute Common Stock as is equal to the Aigned
Value multiplied by 'tvice" the number of sharcs of Common
Stock for which the Option was exercisable immediately prior to





194. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.. 20)1 N.C. Bu". Ct,, 01-CVS--i075.
1140.
195. Id.
196. Id. SJ, 78-86.
197. Varallo & Raju, supra note 184, at nn.0-!8 and accompanying tet.
198. Id. at n.18 and accompanying text (discus'ing stock tiption pro~iuion that
function as breakup fees).
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deal.'99 Absent any other justifications for this unusually high
termination fee, the court primarily relied on the marketplace test
in order to determine whether this termination fee amount was
impermissibly preclusive. ° The court held that the termination
fee was allowable for several reasons. First, Wachovia stock was
persistently traded at a higher price than the value of the First
Union/Wachovia merger agreement after the announcement of the
proposed merger.20 ' Apparently, "the market.., did not believe
other offers were precluded., 22  Second, SunTrust stated in its
proxy statement that it was prepared to pay the full $780 million
breakup fee and still offer Wachovia shareholders a superior
deal.2 3 Third, Wachovia shareholders would not suffer a huge loss
if they disapproved the merger because they could wait until the
eighteen-month option expired to entertain another offer.t 4
Arguably, the court gave too much weight to the
marketplace test. First, Wachovia stock might be overpriced
because of imperfect information accessible to traders. For
instance, SunTrust's unsolicited merger proposal might be a key
reason for the arguable "over-pricing" of Wachovia stocks.
Second, despite SunTrust's statement, it eventually failed to offer a
substantively superior offer to Wachovia shareholders.
Apparently, the court did not doubt SunTrust's intent to carry out
its promise. Otherwise, the court would not have based its
opinion, at least in part, on SunTrust's statement.0 5 It could be
argued that the very fact that SunTrust failed to present a
meaningfully superior offer proves the preclusive effect of the
huge breakup fee. Finally, the court seemed to contradict its own
view presented in the later part of the opinion by asserting that the
option agreement was not coercive because Wachovia
shareholders could simply wait out the eighteen-month duration of
the option agreement.2 6 In Part B of Section V of the opinion, the
court pronounced the non-termination clause coercive and thus
199. First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 143.
200. See id. T 145-57; see also infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.





206. Compare First Union Corp., 2001 N.C. Bus. Ct., 01-CVS-10075, 147, with
Part B of Section V of the First Union Corp. opinion, id. 163.
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invalid because it would preclude the Wachovia board from
considering or recommending other merger deals for five months
after a shareholder vote disapproving the merger with First
Union.207 If, as the court held, it was not coercive for Wachovia
shareholders to wait for eighteen months without considering any
business combination with a third-party, why was it coercive for
them to wait for only five months?2" ' The court did not reconcile
its conflicting rulings regarding those issues.
The marketplace test should not be the sole test relied
upon by a court to evaluate the preclusive effect of a key break-up
fee clause. In addition to the marketplace test, the court should
also determine whether the main motivation of the break-up fee
provision is to deter third party bids or to cover reasonable
transaction costs (including opportunity costs and costs for
regulatory approval).210
VI. CONCLUSION
On September 1, 2001, the new Wachovia emerged from
the completed merger of First Union and Wachovia. 2" The
combined company has received optimistic reviews from Wall
Street as to its long-term prospects.2- Besides the new Wachovia,
headquartered in Charlotte, the merger of First Union and
Wachovia left two significant legacies to the State of North
Carolina.2 3  First, the North Carolina corporate statutes were
amended to prevent shareholders of public corporations from
calling a special shareholder meeting without the consent of the
board or a proper provision in the company's articles of
incorporation. 24 This new law significantly undermines the
shareholders' right to vote on fundamental corporate changes
including merger deals. 215
207. Id- I 155-63.
208. Id. 147.
209. Id. Ti 161-62.
210. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
211. See Boraks, This Sunner's Clifflzanger, supra note 1, at 4.
212. See id
213. See supra notes 214-220 and accompanying text.
214. See 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 2001-201, § 15 (codified as amended at N.C. GE%.
STAT. § 55-7-02(a)); see also supra note 10 (quoting the text of the amended statute).
215. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
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The second legacy was a judicial review process for deal
protective measures in contested takeovers.1 6 In First Union
Corp., the North Carolina Business Court undertook to develop
judicial tools to strike the appropriate balance between
shareholder power and board authority in corporate mergers.
This was the first time a North Carolina court had the opportunity
to review a contested takeover of a public corporation.2z8 The
approach which the court adopted was pro-management because it
placed the burden upon the shareholders to prove that the board
breached its fiduciary duty in a contested takeover context.1 9 The
North Carolina Business Court's opinion in First Union is an
important precedent for contested takeover cases in the banking
industry where hostile bids are still rare but are expected to grow
more common in the future.2
LIJUN K. YANG
216. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
220. See David Boraks, Hostile Bids, supra note 4, at 1 (citing changes to
accounting rules and a shrinking pool of attractive franchises as reasons to spur a rise
in hostile takeover bids in financial market).
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